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Introduction 
After prolonged discussions and negotiations, the Farm, Nutrition and Bioenergy Act of 
2007 (also known as 2007 Farm Bill) was finally passed and signed into law in May of 
2008. While the provisions of the Act address a wide variety of issues, one of the critical 
changes from the risk management prospective became introduction of the Average Crop 
Revenue Election (ACRE) program. The ACRE program is a revenue-based plan designed as 
an alternative to government support programs such Counter-Cyclical Payments (CCPs) 
that were introduced in the 2002 Farm Bill. 
Generally speaking, CCPs become effective when the average market price for the 
covered commodity falls below the target national price. A shortcoming of the CCP is that it 
only addresses price risk and is not based on the crops or acres actually being grown by the 
farmer each year. The ACRE program is designed to address these problems by keying the 
payments off the benchmark state yield multiplied by the ACRE guarantee price for a 
specific commodity.  
The payoff of ACRE program depends on realizations of state-level revenues and 
thus  may be related to the payoffs of other risk management instruments available to 
farmers, such as crop revenue coverage (CRC) and to a lesser extent the actual production 
history (APH) insurance contracts.  Since the decision to switch to ACRE is irreversible, 
understanding the full effect of ACRE on producer’s risk exposure is an important factor in 
making the decision. 
  Vedenov and Power analyzed the effect of government support programs on risk-
reducing effectiveness of crop insurance instruments under the provisions of 2002 Farm   3 
Bill and the versions of 2007 Farm Bill being discussed at the time. In particular, they 
investigated the hypothesis that a combination of (free) government price support 
programs and yield insurance may provide risk reducing benefits comparable to those of 
revenue insurance for the crop/region combinations characterized by low correlation 
between prices and yields. They found partial support of this hypothesis for corn 
production in Texas under the provisions of 2002 Bill and one of the intermediate versions 
of the 2007 Farm Bill. 
However, the ACRE program adopted in the final version of the 2007 Farm Bill 
turned out to be substantially different from the intermediate alternatives. This paper 
attempts to address this issue and analyze the effect of the ACRE program on risk-reducing 
effectiveness of insurance products. To the best of our knowledge this is a first attempt to 
analyze the effect of ACRE program on the risk management decisions of crop producers. In 
particular, we compare the risk-reducing effectiveness of two most common insurance 
contracts — APH and CRC — under the provisions of the 2002 Farm Bill and under ACRE 
program for representative cotton producer in Texas and corn producer in Illinois. These 
particular crop/region combinations are selected so as to represent situations of low and 
high price-yield correlations, respectively. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses related 
literature and presents a formal decision model of a representative farmer followed by a 
section outlining stochastic simulation methodology and data. The results are presented 
and discussed next. The last section concludes. 
Analytical Model   4 
The model used for the present analysis is similar to that of Vedenov and Power. In 
particular, we consider a representative farmer who grows a single crop (cotton in Texas 
or corn in Illinois), receives payments from any government programs she is eligible for, 
and may purchase either a yield or a revenue insurance contract. The analysis includes the 
direct, counter-cyclical, and loan-deficiency payments (DP, CCP, and LDP, respectively) as 
well as yield and revenue insurance contracts (APH and CRC). The brief descriptions of the 
programs and their payoffs are summarized in Appendix A. 
Average Crop Revenue Election 
The ACRE program is triggered by the state-level revenue dropping below a guaranteed 
level which is defined as a product of the benchmark yield and an ACRE guarantee price. 
The benchmark state yield,  , is determined as the Olympic average1 of the actual state 
yields for the previous five years and the ACRE guaranteed price,  , is the simple 
average of the national marketing year price for the previous two years. Switching to ACRE 
is an irreversible decision for the duration of the Farm Bill. Furthermore, producers who 
choose to elect the ACRE program must forgo the CCP payments and accept a 20 percent 
reduction in direct payments and a 30 percent reduction in marketing assistance loan 
rates. 
More formally, the payoff of the ACRE program is defined as 
 
                                                             
1 i.e. the average of values remaining after the highest and lowest observations are dropped   5 
where   is the acreage planted under a crop,   is the realized state average yield as 
determined by the National Agricultural Statistical Service (USDA/NASS),   is the 
realized marketing year average price, and   is the Olympic average of farm-level 
yields for the most recent five years (Zulauf, Vitale and Dicks, 2008). In addition, the payoff 
of the direct payment in Appendix A needs to be multiplied by 0.8, while the payoff of the 
LDP is replaced by 
. 
Scenario Comparison 
In order to evaluate the effect of ACRE on effectiveness of crop insurance contracts we 
constructed a representative farmer’s final wealth under four scenarios reflecting the 
possible combinations of two insurance contracts — APH and CRC —with 2002 and 2008 





where, W0 is an initial wealth, a is planted acreage, Premium is per-acre insurance premium 
for a corresponding insurance contract with selected coverage level, and the payments are 
expanded in Appendix A. 
Measuring Risk-Reducing Effectiveness   6 
The four scenarios were compared using the expected utility framework. In particular, the 
representative farmer was assumed to prefer an alternative that maximized the CRRA 
power utility function  . In particular, the expected utility optimization was 
used to determine the optimal coverage level for each insurance product under the 
provisions of both Farm Bills. 
Data and Simulation Methodology 
Following Vedenov and Power, we used the Monte-Carlo simulations combined with the 
copula approach to simulate the distributions of the net wealth and corresponding 
expected utilities. The approach is briefly outlined below. A more complete overview of 
copulas and specific details of simulation methodology can be found in Cherubini, Luciano 
and Vecchiato; Nelsen; and Vedenov and Power. 
For the purposes of the analysis, historical yield data at national, state, county and 
farm level were used along with data on cash, marketing year average (MYA), and futures 
prices for cotton and corn. Given the shortness of farm-level data, the primary joint 
distribution modeled was that of futures prices and county-level data. Frank copula was 
used to model the dependence structure. The choice of this particular copula is justified by 
the desire to have clearly defined tail dependence typically observed between yields and 
prices. The functional form of the Frank copula is 
 
where  is a parameter that can be estimated from data (Nelsen, 2006).   7 
The copula was combined with kernel density estimate of the marginal distribution 
of state-level yields   and log-normal marginal distribution of harvest-time futures 
prices   and used to generate Monte-Carlo draws of the pairs ( . As in 
Vedenov and Power, the local cash prices, p, and the marketing year average prices,   
were modeled as linear functions of the harvest-time futures prices f1. The latter were also 
used as proxy for the CRC harvest price,  . In particular, we estimated 
 
 
The realizations of the county and farm-level yields were then generated from the 
realizations of the state-level yields using the Frank copula and kernel-density estimates of 
the corresponding marginal distributions. 
Model Parameters 
To implement the analysis, data were collected for a number of price and yield variables. 
Data for cash and market year average prices were collected from NASS for the time period 
1969-2007. To approximate cash prices, we used the average prices received by producers 
in November (cotton) and October (corn). Futures price data were obtained for the time 
period 1970-2008 from the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) in the case of corn and from the 
Intercontinental Exchange, formerly New York Cotton Exchange, in the case of cotton.   
The Risk Management Agency (RMA) provides guidelines to determine the planting-
time futures price f0 and the CRC base price PCRC. For cotton, we use the average of the   8 
futures price during the period 1/15 to 2/15, while for corn we use the average of the 
futures price in February. Moreover, we approximated both the harvest-time futures price 
f1 and the CRC harvest price PHarv using the average futures price in November for both 
cotton and corn.  
The parameters of the normal distribution in the harvest-time futures price 
equation were obtained from the sample mean and standard deviation of the data series for 
f d ln . Indeed, test results showed that we could not reject the null of normality for 
f d ln at the 90% confidence level. We then ran a regression of cash and market year prices 
on d ln f to estimate the model parameters.  
To compare the risk-reducing effectiveness of APH and CRC insurance combined 
with government payments under ACRE and under the previous 2002 Farm Bill (DP, LDP, 
CCP) , we considered three regions, namely: irrigated and non-irrigated cotton production 
in Texas and corn production in Illinois. Irrigated cotton production is expected to stabilize 
yields, which are then less correlated with national prices than in the case of no irrigation. 
Illinois is the largest corn-growing state in the country. Yields in Illinois tend to be highly 
correlated with national prices.  
We considered representative farms located in Hockley County, Texas, for irrigated 
cotton and Hale County, Texas, for non-irrigated cotton, and Piatt County, Illinois, for corn. 
These counties were selected because they are representative for their states. Each farm 
was assumed to consist of 100 acres, all of which were treated as base acres for the 
purposes of government payments. Initial wealth (W0) was set to $50,000 for all three 
regions.    9 
Yield data at the county, state and national levels were collected from the National 
Agricultural Statistical Service (NASS) for the time period 1969-2007, while farm-level 
yield data were obtained from Texas AgriLife Research for Hale County, Texas (87 
observations), Hockley County, Texas (18 observations) and Piatt County, Illinois, (545 
observations). Then, we converted farm-level data into multiplicative shocks on the 
corresponding country yields. We fitted a log-linear trend to county, state and national 
yield series, and converted all observations to multiplicative shocks on the trend. The base 
trend year is 2007 because it is the most recent year for which all data are available.  
Tables 2 and 3 summarize the descriptive statistics of the historical data used in the 
analysis. If we consider the correlation between detrended county yields and futures prices 
(in log-differences), we see that it is high for Piatt County, Illinois, low for the no-irrigated 
region of Hale County, Texas, and very low for the irrigated region of Hockley County, 
Texas.  
The Risk Management Agency (RMA) and Farm Service Agency (FSA) websites 
(RMA; FSA) provide information to determine the parameters of the government payments 
and insurance programs in the base year 2007. These are summarized in Table 4. To 
simplify, we used the 1998-2001 averages to set the DP and CCP yields. Details on the ACRE 
programs were obtained from Zulauf and applied to the base year. We set APH price 
election to 100%. The RMA premium calculator was used to determine the actual APH and 
CRC premiums across levels of coverage and for specific counties in 2006.  
The reference risky payoff x was defined as net wealth free of government support. 
We considered risk premiums of 0%, i.e., risk neutrality, 5% and 10%. Table 1 summarizes   10 
information about the coefficient of risk aversion γ that corresponds to each risk premium 
level. The coefficient of risk aversion, for a given risk premium, is highest for Hockley 
County, TX, where cotton production is irrigated. It is 9.45 for a 5% risk premium and 
33.24 for a 10% risk premium. Risk aversion is lower for Piatt County, IL, and lowest for 
Hale County, TX.  
Results 
This section discusses results obtained for the certainty-equivalent wealth based on 
various levels of coverage. For the parameters of both the 2002 Farm Bill and the ACRE 
program, we consider APH and CRC contracts together with government payments. The 
results, presented in table 5, show that to achieve the greatest possible reduction in risk, 
the highest available coverage level should be selected. Indeed, the expected utility of 
wealth for a producer is for the most part increasing in the level of coverage. Note that the 
producer, assuming risk-neutrality, nonetheless selects more coverage than the minimum 
level, particularly in Hockley County, TX, and in Piatt County, IL. This is because the 
insurance premiums are not actuarially fair. Figures 1, 2 and 3 show, for Hale and Hockley 
County, TX, and Piatt County, IL, respectively, the certainty-equivalent wealth across 
insurance contract coverage levels for the case of a 10% risk premium. 
The parameters of the 2002 Farm Bill appear to generate greater certainty-
equivalent wealth than does the ACRE program, at least in the case of the Hale and Hockley 
Counties, TX. This may be explained by difference in price-yield correlations. Indeed, our 
results show that contracts are more effective under the 2002 Farm Bill for both Texas 
counties, but are less effective for Piatt County, IL. Lastly, for the case of a risk-averse   11 
producer, CRC insurance appears to be a more efficient instrument to manage risk than 
APH insurance in all counties studied. One explanation for this finding is that the CRC base 
price is allowed to increase during the period between planting and harvest, while APH 
contract prices, established by the FCIC, are fixed during this period.  
Conclusion 
The purpose of this paper is to compare the impact on the effectiveness of crop insurance 
of the new ACRE government support program with the previous, 2002 Farm Bill program. 
Four cases are considered: APH vs. CRC insurance and ACRE program vs. the 2002 Farm 
Bill programs. Three representative geographical regions are considered: cotton in Hale 
County (non-irrigated) and Hockley County (irrigated), TX, and corn in Piatt County, IL. Our 
findings suggest that under both the 2002 Farm Bill provisions and the ACRE program 
parameters, CRC insurance is more effective than is APH insurance. The effectiveness of 
insurance under the ACRE program appears to be more variable across the studied 
counties than is the effectiveness of insurance under the 2002 Farm Bill.  
   12 
Appendix A. Description and Payoffs of Government Support Programs and 
Insurance Contracts 
The following provides a brief overview of the government payments and insurance 
contracts used in the paper. More details and most up-to-date information can be found on 
the websites of Farm Service Agency (www.fsa.usda.gov) and Risk Management Agency 
(www.rma.usda.gov) of USDA. 
Direct Payments (DP) 
Direct payment is a fixed amount paid to the farmers according to the formula 
 
where  is the direct payment rate,   is the base yield, and   is base acres. 
Loan Deficiency Payments (LDP) 
LDP is equivalent to a marketing assistance loan and is essentially a free put option on crop 
price. The payment is calculated as 
, 
where a is planted acreage,   is realized yield, P is the commodity price, and   is 
the marketing loan rate. 
Counter-Cyclical Payments (CCP) 
CCPs were authorized by the 2002 Farm Bill and provide income support whenever the 
market price falls below a predetermined target price adjusted for direct payment rate. 
Formally, 
,   13 
where   is the CCP base yield,   is the CCP target price,   is the marketing year 
average price, and the remaining variables are as defined above. 
Actual Production History Insurance (APH) 
APH is a basic yield protection insurance that pays off whenever the realized yield drops 
below a selected coverage level. Formally, 
, 
where   is the realized farm-level yield,   is the coverage level expressed as 
percent of the historical average yield  , a is the planted acreage, and   is the APH 
price. 
Crop Revenue Coverage (CRC) 
CRC guarantees a certain level of revenue defined as a portion of the product of the APH 
yield and a pre-set price so that 
, 
where   is the coverage level, p is the realized price,   is the CRC price,    is the 
harvest time price, and the rest of the variables are the same as in APH.   14 
Table 1: Risk Aversion Coefficients 
  Risk Aversion Coefficient γ 
Risk Premium θ  Hale County, TX  Hockley County, TX  Piatt County, IL 
0%  0  0  0 
5%  2.164  9.449  2.835 
10%  4.459  33.244  5.465 
   15 
Table 2: Summary of County, State, and National Yield and Price Data for Cotton and Corn 
for the 2008 Crop Year 
  Cotton  Corn 
  Hale  Hockley  Texas  U.S  Piatt  Illinois  U.S 
2007 planted acreage, 
thousand acres 
205.4  256  4900  10535  162  13200  93600 





   
153.005 
(bu/ac) 
   
APH yield  930.56  722.156      171.145     
Correlation between 
detrended yields and log-
difference in futures prices 
0.256  -0.089  -0.064  -0.118  -0.42  -0.48  -0.51 
ACRE benchmark  
state yield 
(Olympic average of the 
actual state yields for 
previous 5 years) 
   
801.9732 
(pound/ac) 




ACRE guarantee price 
(simple average of the 
national market price for 
the previous 2 years) 
   
0.518 
($/pound) 
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Table 3: Summary of Parameters of Cash and MYA Price Regression for Cotton and Corn 
  Parameters of Cash and MYA Price Regression 
  Texas  Illinois 
  Cash  MYA  Cash  MYA 
b0  0.027(0.403)  0.07(0.077)  0.15(0.237)  0.205(0.283) 
b1  0.822(0.000)  0.741(0.000)  0.86(0.000)  0.905(0.000) 
σresidual  0.0313  0.0379  0.129  0.1957 
R
2  0.912  0.851  0.918  0.851 
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Table 4: Parameters of Government Payments and Insurance Contracts for Cotton and Corn 
in 2008 
 
Cotton (Hale and Hockley 
county in Texas) 
(unit : $/pound) 
Corn (Piatt county in Illinois) 
(unit : $/bushel) 
DP rate, PDP  0.0667  0.28 
Target Price for CCPs, PCCP  0.724  2.63 
Marketing Loan Rate, PLDP  0.52  2.07 
APH established price, PAPH  0.66  3.75 
CRC base price, PCRC  0.77  5.4 
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Table 5.: Risk-Reducing Effectiveness of APH vs. CRC Insurance under the Provisions of the 
2002 Farm Bill and the ACRE program 
  Maximum Achievable CE Wealth 
$ Thousands 






















           
0%  $101.7  $92.8  $107.7  75%  85%  85% 
5%  $100.9  $92.4  $106.0  75%  85%  85%  APH 
10%  $100.3  $90.8  $104.5  75%  85%  85% 
0%  $115.7  $100.9  $128.8  80%  85%  85% 
5%  $115.0  $100.2  $128.7  80%  85%  85%  CRC 





           
0%  $92.7  $85.3  $106.8  75%  85%  85% 
5%  $91.8  $84.9  $105.1  75%  85%  85%  APH 
10%  $91.1  $83.4  $103.6  75%  85%  85% 
0%  $106.7  $93.4  $128.0  80%  85%  85% 
5%  $106.4  $93.2  $127.9  80%  85%  85%  CRC 
10%  $106.0  $92.9  $127.8  80%  85%  85%   19 
 
 
Figure 1: Risk-Reducing Effectiveness of APH versus CRC under the Provisions of the 2002 
Farm Bill and the ACRE program in 2008, Hale County, TX.   20 
 
 
Figure 2: Risk-Reducing Effectiveness of APH versus CRC under the Provisions of the 2002 
Farm Bill and the ACRE program in 2008, Hockley County, TX.   21 
 
 
Figure 3: Risk-Reducing Effectiveness of APH versus CRC under the Provisions of the 2002 
Farm Bill and the ACRE program in 2008, Piatt County, IL. 
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